abstract Violent encounters between Spanish American guarda costas and British vessels during the early decades of the eighteenth century sparked the War of Jenkins' Ear in 1739, a war that started in the Caribbean over issues of inter-imperial contraband trade. Despite the causes of the war, Spanish American guarda costas out of port cities such as Cartagena de Indias outfitted their ships through illicit British supply chains. Moreover, the maritime violence leading up to the declaration of war helped the Spanish official José Patiño push for British acquiescence to Spain's territorial designs on the Italian peninsula. Sent to the Caribbean to seek revenge for Spanish depredations against their shipping, the British Royal Navy also engaged in contraband trade so they could fully equip their vessels in the competitive environment of the eighteenth-century maritime world. Contraband trade in the circum-Caribbean served as a tool in Britain's and Spain's political economy while simultaneously producing the need for more smuggling and eventual conflict. For Spanish America, moreover, British contraband supplies in places such as Cartagena de Indias proved invaluable for its defense against invasion by British forces during the war itself.
Anchored near the channel of Boca Chica in early 1741, at the head of the largest British amphibious force organized to that date, Admiral Edward Vernon opened an intriguing letter.
1 Smuggled out of Cartagena de Indias's jail by an escaped Turkish prisoner, the encrypted message gave detailed information about the city's defenses gathered by British captives held there since the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear. The captives assured Vernon that ''There is not half the difficulty that doth appear to you'' in attacking the city.
2 Both Vernon and the captives shared the belief widespread among the British that Cartagena's lack of supplies from Madrid made it an easy target for invasion. 3 A forest of foreign masts crowding the port city throughout the early decades of the eighteenth century further indicated to European observers that the Spanish Empire was inept at providing for, defending, and controlling its subjects. 4 As cannon fire echoed through the streets of Cartagena at the beginning of the siege, Vernon's informers would have eagerly awaited a prompt victory and their release. The admiral and his invasion force, however, ''Gott more blows than Honour'' during the ordeal. 5 Spanish American defenders killed 643 of the British invaders who attempted to take the Fort of St. Lazar. 6 Vernon's miscalculation of the strength of Cartagena's defenses proved to be one of the more embarrassing British losses during the War of Jenkins' Ear.
The assumption that smuggling and imperial loyalty were mutually exclusive informed Vernon's invasion attempt, accounting for the admiral's ultimate failure. British planners misunderstood the ways in which daily acts of disloyalty in Cartagena, such as permitting a flourishing contraband trade, actually served to reinforce Spanish imperial power in the Caribbean. 7 Rather than imagining contraband trade as a regrettable outcome of mercantile policies carried out by avaricious individuals, the case of Cartagena illuminates the imperial benefits of illicit trade for the Spanish Crown. Technically illegal supplies like wheat and naval stores allowed Spanish officials in Cartagena, such as Gabriel de Mendinueta, to equip guarda costa vessels and the city's garrisons. 8 The situation that Vernon encountered in Cartagena reflected the fact that certain kinds of contraband proved essential to the functioning of Spain's defensive strategies in the Caribbean.
Though Spanish American officials in Cartagena used Caribbean smuggling as a tool of imperial defense in the early decades of the eighteenth 6. The Vernon Papers, 17. 7. The view of Cartagena, and Spanish America more generally, as disloyal and venal was not fully corrected even in the aftermath of the failed invasion. For example, Sir Charles Knowles, an officer in the Royal Navy during the siege of Cartagena, reflected on the ''pusillanimous Spaniards'' after the invasion's failure to take that ''nest of smugglers, '' century, Vernon also found himself reliant on contraband trade to supply his naval crews. Charged with avenging the violent attacks of Spain's guarda costas against British shipping and orchestrating the Caribbean theater of the War of Jenkins' Ear, Vernon found himself consistently undersupplied. In a maritime environment where seamen found competition for their services fierce, the admiral used vessels of the British Royal Navy to carry contraband goods to ensure that his men were clothed, fed, and fairly paid. 9 In this way Vernon supplied his own naval crews while advancing British free trade designs in Spanish America through contraband trade. The cases of both Vernon and Mendinueta point to the ways in which, rather than being a clandestine and self-serving activity, illegal inter-imperial trade served the purposes of metropolitan planners.
Historians of illicit trade in the Caribbean have tended to emphasize corruption and the proscriptive nature of Spanish law as causal factors for smuggling. In this first line of argument, Caribbean smuggling resulted from the venality of officials involved in the trade. In the words of one scholar, the port of Cartagena ''was a hotbed of illegal activity. '' 10 The largescale smuggling witnessed by eighteenth-century observers depended, another scholar has argued, on the ''collaboration of the royal officials'' in Spanish America who were ''frequently denounced . . . for venality and corruption. '' 11 Bribery serves for some as an explanation of how so much contraband moved through Spanish American ports. According to the historian J. H. Elliott, colonial officials ''would wink at this illicit trade once their palms had been greased. '' 12 Overall, this picture of the political economy of smuggling points to the easy illicit relationships carried on between subjects of different empires out of sight of their metropolitan superiors. In this system, the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean prevented imperial officials from reining in their perfidious subjects who appeared to be more comfortable economic bedfellows with each other than with their own merchants. In this narrative, individual corruption served as the driving force in the Caribbean economy. 12. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, 224. 13. Nor is this an inaccurate way to describe many cases of inter-imperial smuggling. For example, in the decades before the outbreak of war, the first viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de Villalonga, Conde de la Cueva, profited immensely from his tacit approval of and engagement in illicit trade. The viceroy's behavior came to the attention of the Crown, and Villalonga was removed from office; Archivo Gen-A second historiographic thread, which is related to this view of contraband trade resulting from the venality of officials in the colonies, emphasizes the proscriptive nature of Spanish law. As the historian Frank Jay Moreno lucidly explains, Spanish law frequently outlined humanistic and idealistic contours of proper behavior with the tacit understanding that such laws would, of necessity, be broken.
14 Furthermore, the issue of corruption becomes difficult to define in the Spanish American world, where the structure and dissemination of authority depended on ties of patronage that connected the king to his subjects across the ocean. As the historian Alejandro Cañeque argues, the Spanish imperial system was one of an ''economy of favor'' in which agents of the empire routinely used client-patron incentives, such as bribery, to cement allegiance to a distant king. 15 In this sense, corruption occurred only when agents of the Spanish king acted against the king's interests in pursuit of their own enrichment. It was, in fact, this ''network of personal relations,'' according to the historian Zacarías Moutoukias, that ''served to make the administrative structure more flexible'' and capable of assimilating political and economic challenges with a proscriptive and idealistic legal culture. 16 Violent encounters between guarda costas and British seamen throughout the circum-Caribbean in the years leading up to Vernon's siege of Cartagena point to a different way of interpreting the place of contraband trade within the political economies of the British and Spanish empires. The War of Jenkins' Ear emerged as a conflict over the seizure of British ships accused of smuggling in Spanish America, but it could not have been fought in peripheral regions like Cartagena without those illegal supply chains. In this sense, Cartagena's political economy functioned in a vicious cycle: Jamaican interlopers supplied the Spanish guarda costa vessels that perpetrated the violence against British shipping that brought the two crowns to war, thereby increasing Cartagena's demand for illicit goods. Moreover, imperial planners in Madrid manipulated the guarda costa attacks on British shipping for their own geopolitical purposes. the buildup to Vernon's siege of Cartagena illuminates the internal logic of smuggling that provided for the city's protection while simultaneously creating the need for more defense. For both Vernon and Mendinueta, engaging in illicit trade constituted violating the letter of the law, yet such daily acts of disobedience provided both men with the means to wage war in support of their respective crowns.
THE CASE OF CARTAGENA Situated in the tropical lowlands of the Spanish Main, Cartagena de Indias overlooked one of the most famed bays in the Americas. Named for the equally impressive harbor city of Cartagena, Spain, Cartagena de Indias was constructed on a sandy island engulfed to its north by a wide bay and hemmed in on the south by a narrow slit of water. The Bay of Cartagena was especially well suited for harboring ships; as Spanish naval officials described, it ''extends two leagues and a half from north to south; has a sufficient depth of water and good anchorage; and [is] so smooth, that the ships are no more agitated than on a river. '' 17 Situated on the brim of the Spanish Caribbean and within short sailing time of Porto Bello, in Panama, Cartagena de Indias became the cornerstone of Spain's trans-Atlantic trade with the southern territories of Peru. The Spanish galleons dispatched for the trade fair at Porto Bello weighed anchor first at Cartagena and waited to receive word that the treasure ships of Peru had reached Panama. Once the announcement arrived that the silver-laden ships had landed, the Spanish galleons would leave their anchorage at Cartagena and sail to Porto Bello to start off the annual trade fair. At the conclusion of that fair, if everything went to imperial specifications, the fleet would once again return to Cartagena before making the voyage back to Spain. 18 In this imperial scheme Cartagena de Indias proved important not for what it contributed to the trade fair but for the safe landing and refitting it provided the flota (fleet) on both ends of its voyage.
The sheer value of trade anchored at Cartagena de Indias kept the port city in the forefront of Spain's strategic calculations in the Caribbean. One scholar estimates that during the middle decades of the eighteenth century, nearly 1,800,000 pesos worth of silver a year arrived at the port of Cartagena before being sailed back to Cadiz. 19 That silver from the mines of Potosí and the interior supplied the Spanish Crown with the bullion it needed to advance its European objectives in a century of near-constant warfare. The successful seizure of the 1628 treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba by the Dutch privateer Piet Heyn, a bounty worth roughly 4.8 million silver pesos, justified the Spanish Crown's single-minded focus on the treasure fleet in the Caribbean.
20 Possession of a port described at the time as admitting ''only one ship at a time, and even she must be obliged to keep close to shore,'' guaranteed that in at least one leg of the silver's trans-Atlantic voyage, metropolitan planners could be assured of its safety. 21 The amount of silver that passed through Cartagena de Indias each year inspired the envy of Spain's imperial rivals. Cartagena suffered successful sacks by Francis Drake in 1586, Henry Morgan in 1668, and the French baron of Pointis, Bernard Louis Desjean, in 1697. 22 Foreign aggression against the city meant that by the mid-eighteenth century, providing for the city's security became a major concern. According to official Spanish sources, ''The garrison in times of peace consist[ed] of ten companies of regulars, each containing, officers included, 77 men; besides several companies of militia.'' 23 The primary responsibility of Cartagena's imperial officials was to prevent the 1628 Cuban disaster from recurring and guarantee safe anchorage to the galleon fleet. The territorial toeholds gained by Spain's rivals in the Caribbean were initially intended as staging grounds for attacks on Spain's lucrative trade with its American colonies. Surrounded by aggressive rivals at Jamaica, Curaçao, and Martinique, Cartagena was central to the safe passage of the galleon fleet.
Despite being well defended and strategically important, Cartagena de Indias suffered, along with the majority of Spanish America in the eighteenth century, from a lack of Spanish trade goods, which left residents with few legal options for acquiring merchandise. As the president of the Audiencia de Santa Fe explained to the king, ''the pitiful situation'' in New Granada was that ''the land has so many riches and abundance [yet] . . . almost all of the inhabitants and citizens are beggars.'' 24 Despite the tremendous wealth that passed through the port of Cartagena, the region itself remained trade-poor. Periods between flotas produced hardships for the residents and soldiers alike in Cartagena. According to visiting officers of the Spanish navy, the lengths of time without trade fairs ''the inhabitants of Cartagena call tiempo muerto, the dead time; for, with regard to the trade carried on with the other governments [of the Spanish Empire], it is not worth notice. '' 25 Through the stifling heat of Caribbean summers or entire years in which the flota never came, metropolitan planners expected local officials to keep the port of Cartagena safe and clear but provided little by way of much-needed supplies.
The economic strain on Cartagena, moreover, was not particular to the eighteenth century. Even during the economic boom of the sixteenth century, Cartagena relied on outside funds for the maintenance of its port and garrisons. The placer mining (mining of alluvial deposits) that produced a flush of gold at Cartagena's founding faltered in the later decades of the seventeenth century. What little gold enslaved Africans coaxed out of the region's tropical streambeds during the course of a century proved insufficient for the construction and maintenance of Cartagena's military installations. 26 Imperial planners used the situado, or treasury funds, from wealthier areas of Spanish America to pay for the defense of Cartagena's port. Drawing the majority of its situado from Quito, Cartagena scraped together enough wealth, as Spanish officials reported, ''for keeping up the fortifications, furnishing the artillery, and other expences, necessary for the defence of the place and its forts. '' 27 Spain diverted resources to the defense of Cartagena because of the port's strategic importance in the imperial trade system.
Despite the primacy of the city's port, Cartagena's hinterlands proved incapable of supporting the fleets of the Spanish Main. Cartagena dealt with a very basic problem as a tropical outpost-it was too hot to cultivate European staples. As one moves inland from New Granada's hot and humid 24 coastline, increased elevation and decreased temperatures yield to a landscape more favorable to wheat cultivation. Despite the relative proximity between the port and the highland city of Santa Fe de Bogotá, however, wheat cost 2,000 percent more in Cartagena than in the highlands where it was grown. 28 The voyage from the tierra fría (cold land) in the spine of the Andes to the tropical lowlands took four arduous months, during which time the wheat generally went bad-if it arrived at all. Without a reliable domestic supply or legal imports of wheat, officials in Cartagena relied on foreign supplies. The proximity of Jamaica, moreover, plugged Cartagena into the provisions trade circuits of British North America.
COMMERCIAL INVASION AND THE GUARDA COSTAS
From the perspective of British officials and interlopers, the island of Jamaica provided a way station in the heart of the Caribbean from which to launch smuggling operations into Spanish America. The prevalence of British smugglers out of Jamaica heightened the need for Spain to outfit guarda costas, amplifying the chance for violent maritime encounters between British and Spanish vessels. Jamaica emerged in the center of this increasingly tense maritime world as the main refreshment station for Britain's exclusive slave trade to Spain's American colonies, known as the asiento contract. Starting in 1713, Queen Anne granted the privilege of conducting the slave trade to the newly formed South Sea Company. Jamaica quickly became the first stop in the Caribbean for the South Sea Company's trans-Atlantic slaving vessels. Initially both Barbados and Jamaica were used; by the mid1720s Jamaica had eclipsed Barbados in importance owing to the resources of the island and the volume of trade carried on there. 30 The abundance of cattle and produce in the early decades of the eighteenth century, before more land on the island was dedicated to the production of sugar, meant that the factories there were well stocked.
31 South Sea Company agents recuperated and quarantined the enslaved Africans at Kingston after the horrors of the Middle Passage in an attempt to make them appear healthy before being shipped to their final destinations for sale. Jamaica's location appealed to others than just the legal representatives of the South Sea Company, and the island provided ample opportunity for smugglers carrying illicit cargoes to Spanish America. Private smugglers and the company's ships, moreover, encountered stiff competition for Spanish American trade from Britain's Royal Navy. Upon taking his post as governor, Nicholas Lawes was appalled by the conduct of the Royal Navy stationed at Jamaica. Despite the nearly constant dangers of piracy and harassment by Spanish privateers, Lawes found the British ships assigned to the island absent. The very navy vessels on which Jamaicans depended for their security, the Winchelsea, the Ludlow Castle, and the Diamond, had sailed down to the Spanish Main days before, laden with contraband goods. Lawes's rude awakening to the operations of the British Royal Navy in the Caribbean would not be the last of his short tenure, nor would the navy's dedication to smuggling ebb in the coming years. 32 The participation of the Royal Navy in trade that Spanish imperial agents considered illicit indicates an organized and aggressive commercial pressure on the part of the British. Those exerting this pressure are not adequately described by terms such as interloper and smuggler, which denote a small-scale illegality rather than an institutionalized attempt to break open Spanish American ports on the part of the British navy. The Royal Navy's engagement in the contraband trade also escalated opportunities for violence between the two crowns in the waters of the Caribbean.
Spain confronted this veritable commercial invasion of the Crown's American possessions without a strong naval presence of its own. As a result, Spanish imperial planners issued corsair patents to captains willing to defend Spanish American waters by searching and seizing smuggling vessels. Under these patents, which stemmed from precedent set in the seventeenth century, Spain awarded successful seizures with a portion of the prize money, to be adjudicated in local courts. 33 Commercial incentives on both sides created flashpoints of violence across the Caribbean as guarda costa vessels and British merchantmen encountered one another on the high seas. Most of these meetings met with ''the usual Compliments of hanging, burning Matches between their Fingers, &c.'' 34 Spanish privateers were accused in the British American press of excessive violence, such as when a 35 The spread of guarda costas throughout Spanish American ports turned British contraband trading into a dangerous venture, while the increased presence of ships of the British Royal Navy raised the stakes for Spanish privateers as well.
In this environment of simmering conflict, a Jamaican sloop weighed anchor in the Bay of Cartagena de Indias in February 1729. The sloop had sailed south from the British island, choosing to land at the well-fortified port instead of any other point along the 1,500 leagues of relatively undefended coastline running from Caracas to Lima. 36 The Jamaican vessel would have passed through the channel of Boca Chica, that strait so narrow that only one ship could sail through at a time. On the vessel's left stood the fort of San Luis de Boca Chica, a fortification at the far end of Tierra Bomba, whose cannons sat poised for action as the Jamaican vessel sailed past. 37 Once at the port, the Jamaican interloper unloaded two hundred barrels of flour in clear view of Mendinueta and other port officials.
38 Like so many foreign merchants unloading cargo in Spanish American port cities, this Jamaican interloper presumably paid a handsome bribe and profited from Mendinueta's venality.
And yet Mendinueta addressed a letter to Philip V to explain the entrance of the Jamaican's contraband flour. While he remains silent about whether he was bribed by the Jamaican smuggler, he makes clear that the barrels were intended for the Spanish American seamen who would risk their lives seeking out prizes and defending the Crown's commercial interests in the circum-Caribbean. Perhaps Mendinueta's letter serves as a cover, artifice for his own involvement in a lucrative smuggling ring that supplied the residents of Cartagena rather than its hardworking naval crews. Such an accusation may be true and, as is common when observing illegal activity from a remove of several centuries, completely unverifiable. Mendinueta's own promotion to captain of New Granada's guarda costa squadron that same year indicates that at least someone considered his performance as port official commendable. 39 Further, at no point were the guarda costas themselves a mere artifice for illegal activity, as more and more cases of violent maritime encounters in the Caribbean make clear. Rather, Mendinueta's disregard for the law allowed him to use smuggling to further Spain's imperial goals. The case of Mendinueta illustrates the countervailing pressures encountered by subjects of the Spanish Crown in the Caribbean and the pragmatism required to deal with those pressures. While letters of patent for corsairs alleviated Spain's pressing need for increased naval strength for a time, Spanish American corsairs in ports like Cartagena still required foodstuffs and naval stores to operate. In the near-century between the 1670s and the 1760s, only ten galleon fleets passed through the port of Cartagena -six between 1675 and 1700 40 and four between 1713 until 1763. 41 Many of the intended voyages were prevented from embarking from Seville, and later Cádiz, because of the almost continuous state of war on the Continent and in the sea-lanes of the Caribbean. Still others were waylaid in Spanish American ports, unable to sell their merchandise owing to the prevalence of contraband goods that flooded the otherwise empty markets. As a result, port officials like Mendinueta used illicit trade to equip guarda costas. 42 The presence of armed Royal Navy ships near Spanish American ports meant that the safety of the port depended on equipping Spanish American corsairs through any means necessary.
The calculation of supplying the guarda costas versus prosecuting the contraband trade proved as much economic as it was strategic. Contraband trade might have challenged Spain's claim to monopoly privileges over its American possessions, but such challenges mattered little when compared to the wealth brought into Spain through the galleon fleet. Jamaican observers estimated the contraband trade with the Spanish Main yielded between £200,000 and £250,000 a year, but the Spanish Crown remained concerned with the much greater value of Peruvian silver brought to the Iberian Peninsula each year. 43 Assuming a consistent value of £196,000 for Spanish American goods earned through illicit trade and multiplying that value by the thirty-year period in which Britain held the asiento contract, Britain earned roughly £5.9 million. 44 On the other hand, even estimating that the galleon fleet completed a successful voyage only eight times in the same period, with an average of 1,800,000 pesos on board, Spain earned roughly 14.4 million pesos through its trans-Atlantic trade. 45 Though the erratic arrival of the galleons to Cartagena during the eighteenth century proved insufficient to supply the port city, the value of those return shipments of silver far outweighed the value of the contraband trade. From the perspective of Spain's imperial economy, therefore, Mendinueta's primary responsibility lay with protecting the galleons rather than limiting foreign imports.
Furthermore, Mendinueta could not bar entrance to some foreign interlopers while admitting only those needed to supply the garrison and the guarda costas. According to Spanish naval officials, if Mendinueta chose to selectively prosecute some interlopers, then ''no other ship would enter their port. '' 46 Though these same officials assumed that the lack of ships entering the port would upset local officials because it would mean the loss of their source of illicit income, perhaps there is a less cynical way of interpreting the apparent lack of action against foreign interlopers at Cartagena. If confiscation of one foreign vessel would frighten the others away from the port, Mendinueta would sacrifice his ability to provide for Cartagena's coast guard defense by vigorously prosecuting the contraband trade. Lost foreign trade meant leaving the garrisons of Cartagena without a sufficient supply of basic staples, which would jeopardize Mendinueta's ability to defend the port. Within the framework of the larger Spanish political economy, the seizure of foreign vessels at the port of Cartagena would have caused more harm than good. The value of the fleets that passed through Cartagena proved exceptional, but Mendinueta was not the only Spanish American official who used illicit supply chains to defend Spanish possessions and equip guarda costa vessels. According to the historian Joyce Elizabeth Harmon, Manuel de Montiano, the governor of Florida, faced similar circumstances in the year before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear. In a letter sent to the governor of Cuba, Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, Montiano explained his own engagement in contraband trade with British North America. According to Montiano, he allowed a shipment of New York flour to be unloaded at St. Augustine because he worried that the impending conflict and the increased violence in the waters of the Caribbean would cut off his peripheral port from legal supply chains. 48 For that reason, Montiano engaged the easiest supply chain available to him. Güemes y Horcasitas approved of Montiano's decision, which is telling considering the Cuban governor's zealous support of the guarda costas on his own island. One of the guarda costa vessels sponsored by Güemes y Horcasitas, the Triunfo, captained by Domingo López de Avilés, captured ten British vessels in 1737 with the spirited support of the governor. 49 Forced into situations in which the best defense of Spain's American territories meant engaging in foreign commerce, both Güemes y Horcasitas and Montiano acted in ways similar to Mendinueta.
In the cases of Güemes y Horcasitas, Montiano, and Mendinueta, engagement in or support of the contraband trade did not imply disloyalty but, rather, pragmatism. The ability of imperial agents to disregard elements of Spanish law, moreover, was legally institutionalized through appealing to the king. Each of these colonial agents invoked the logic of Spanish imperial law that the king, as the ultimate arbiter of justice, would approve of their actions if he were aware of the situation.
50 While Mendinueta refrained from detailing his dependence on contraband trade to the king, he made clear that Cartagena lacked basic supplies that the British could provide. Mendinueta appealed to King Philip V, stating that without the importation of Jamaican flour, ' 51 In 1731, moreover, Governor Antonio de Salas of Cartagena hinted at the longstanding supply chains running from Jamaica to Cartagena in a testimony to the Crown. According to Salas, ''A packetboat named Sara, her captain John Paris, arrived from Jamaica carrying Goods and supplies for the Ships of the Guardacostas.'' Salas testified that the arrival of goods from Jamaica under the commission of one Domingo Justiniani, resident of that island, was quite frequent. 52 Salas's testimony makes clear that Mendinueta's lack of supplies was met by the regular arrival of contraband goods from Jamaica. Illicit supply chains provided Mendinueta with the means necessary to accomplish his primary responsibility-provide for the guarda costas and Cartagena's defense.
THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE GUARDA COSTAS
Mendinueta took his post in Cartagena during the tumultuous early decades of the eighteenth century as warfare ended in Europe and a new Spanish dynasty was crowned. The War of Spanish Succession gave Madrid the unprecedented opportunity to centralize authority over the country's semiautonomous provinces. Further, inheriting the reforming impulses of the reign of Charles II, the new Bourbon monarchy sat poised for greater control over and reform of the Indies trade. Yet the new king suffered from his own paralyzing personal demons and became dependent on the strong will and force of character of his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese. 53 Farnese brought bright and able ministers into the highest echelons of Spain's government, but her single-minded focus on obtaining Italian principalities for her sons hamstrung many initiatives that her ministers considered more important to Spain's imperial health. 54 One of the highly competent ministers whom Farnese brought to Spanish government, José Patiño, took a special interest in foreign trade and Spanish American governance.
Patiño paid particular attention to the defense of Spain's trade with the American colonies. He rose in the ranks of Spanish bureaucracy partially through his connections with the abbé Alberoni, an association that indebted him greatly to Alberoni's patron, Elizabeth Farnese. 55 While not a reformer in the sense the word is used to describe the later Bourbon ministers, Patiño instinctively recognized the need for Spain to exert a strong naval presence, especially in the face of British commercial aggressions in the Americas. 56 Patiño understood the abuses perpetrated by British merchants, insight he gained when he sent naval officers with the French scientific expedition of Charles Marie de La Condamine to report back to him on the state of the Indies. 57 Patiño also understood Spain's relatively weak bargaining position coming out of a war with no significant naval power. The administrative rise of Patiño worried some British observers. British Ambassador Benjamin Keene lamented, ''No one can be more certain than I am, that [Patiño] is an enemy to all foreign commerce, and as he had more knowledge of trade and of the abuses in the customs than any minister had before him, he will make us more uneasy than any has yet done.'' 58 Farnese's patronage of Patiño, however, forced the minister to reorient his American designs around her Italian concerns, leading to a creative exploitation of American maritime violence for Spanish imperial gain in Italy. 59 In the decades following the War of the Spanish Succession, Spain had neither the finances nor the political will for another continent-wide conflict, despite Farnese's aggressive posturing toward the Italian principalities of Tuscany and Parma. By deploying what one scholar has described as ''the diplomacy of menace,'' Patiño coaxed Britain into the Treaty of Seville, in which Britain promised to support Spain's aggressions in Tuscany and Parma, by promising to rein in the guarda costas. 60 The threat of guarda To prevent violence and the seizure of unlawful prizes, the decree further recommended that ''before [governors] give them Commission to go to Sea, they ought to examine into the Characters of their Persons. ' ' 63 Yet even Patiño's negotiating counterpart, Benjamin Keene, recognized that placing blame on Spanish American governors for guarda costa squadrons seizing unlawful prizes simply added to ''la lenteur Espagnole''; there was little restitution for British American seamen. Beyond Patiño's adding delays to the process of adjudicating on prizes, Keene recognized ''a share of malice'' in the Spanish official's maneuvering, knowing that his well-worn sentiments of outrage at the utter lawlessness of the guarda costas belied little attempt to remedy that maritime violence. 64 Spain's relative lack of naval power going into the eighteenth century meant that the success of Patiño's policy also depended on the illicit trade. 65 As the Daily Courant reported in 1726, ''Don Joseph Patino is very busy in finding out Ways and Means for raising Money for the present Emergencies.'' While the minister recognized the need for a more vigorous policing of Spain's American trade, he offered ''a high Interest to the monied Men here to advance Money; but the Securities for Repayment being precarious, 61. The asiento contract was the right to trade a specified number of slaves to Spanish America. The need for the contract began with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which divided the known world between Spain and Portugal, separating Spain from access to the African coast. From that moment forward, the Spanish Empire depended on foreign importers to bring African slave labor to its colonies across the Atlantic. Britain received the contract as a concession following the War of the Spanish Succession.
62 Though the cost of two men-of-war strapped Spain's already precarious budget, Patiño would have understood the benefits of allowing privateers to patrol American waters. Avarice drove Spanish American seamen in pursuit of valuable British prizes, relieving the state of the heavy burden of providing maritime defense. With his knowledge of trade in the Indies, including its illegal aspects, Patiño would have recognized that many of the naval stores and supplies that the guarda costas needed arrived through illicit channels. 67 Patiño's success, therefore, rested on his ability to use the contraband trade as an instrument of empire. By tapping into British trade networks for supplies, in many ways men like Mendinueta were accomplishing exactly what Patiño wanted. Technically illegal, these trade networks were nonetheless used as supply chains for the nascent Spanish naval presence in the Caribbean.
Despite the ragtag nature of the Spanish guarda costa fleet, the ships that sailed to protect Spanish American shores proved remarkably successful at harassing British American shipping. Although the official mandate of the guarda costa remained to protect Spain's American possessions from illicit traders, its actions belied the larger purpose set out for it by Patiño. British governors throughout the Americas lodged complaints similar to that of Governor Archibald Hamilton of Jamaica, who wrote to the Council of Trade and Plantations that guarda costa units robbed British subjects with impunity throughout the Caribbean. According to Hamilton, many British ships were seized ''for which no other pretence, has in some cases been found, then [sic] that some few Spanish pistolls or inconsiderable sums of coin'd silver . . . has been found on board.'' Worse still were the cases in which British vessels were seized and held under the mere suspicion of illegal trade. 68 While claiming that seized British vessels were innocent of engaging in contraband trade may have served as cover for those vessels' restitution, from the perspective of the Spanish political economy such claims mattered little. If Patiño wished to use the actions of the guarda costas to pressure Britain into supporting his patron's Italian designs, then the ships proved more effective to him the more outrage they incurred among British merchants. Patiño's promises to curtail the cruising of guarda costa vessels in American waters functioned to bring British officials to the negotiating table.
Much ink was spilled in the British American press regarding the violence perpetrated by the guarda costas throughout American waters. Readers of these newspapers encountered many stories like that which ran in Philadelphia on July 14, 1720. According to the article, ''18 Dead Bodies, appearing to be English Men, were found, drove on Shore'' off the coast of Virginia. The paper reported the bodies to be the victims of a guarda costa squadron commissioned out of St. Augustine. As if the shock of eighteen dead were not enough, the story went on to detail how the victims were ''tied back to back,'' one gentleman having been ''found with his hands tied behind him, and his two great toes tied together.'' 69 Ostensibly, the victims were bound to ensure their drowning when thrown into the Atlantic. Whether the unfortunate British subjects had encountered a guarda costa vessel or any of a number of stateless Caribbean pirates remains as unknown now as it would have been in 1720. The article demonstrates, however, the kinds of violence that the British considered the guarda costas capable of committing.
Though the guarda costas were blamed for some maritime violence with scant evidence, many more cases of bloodshed fell squarely on their shoulders. In 1731, for example, a British Royal Navy vessel, the Spence, ''had taken a Spanish Guard la Costa; and on board her found an Englishman newly murdered. '' 70 In another encounter between the British navy and the guarda costas, Captain Berkeley of the Windsor came across an English master and two other men in a canoe off the coast of Hispaniola. According to the English master, his vessel was seized by a guarda costa squadron that kidnapped the three men so they could be used as pilots on a privateering cruise up the North American coast. The master claimed that the Spanish seamen of the guarda costa treated the rest of his crew with ''cruelties,'' such as ''cutting off noses and arms in cold blood and wantonness.'' 71 Though it remains doubtful that Patiño ordered Spanish American officials to condone such bloodshed, the Spanish administration under his watch accomplished little by way of preventing it. The hysteria caused by such tales fed the pressure Patiño needed to place on his British counterparts.
THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE COMMERCIAL PROXY WAR
The violence perpetrated by the guarda costas of Cartagena played well in Patiño's ''diplomacy of menace,'' yet they were also responding to the threatening presence of the British Royal Navy. 72 A change in British policy in the early decades of the eighteenth century meant that, in many ways, Spanish America went from being under economic invasion to being in very real danger of an actual British naval siege. As Governor Lawes of Jamaica realized in the first days of his tenure in office, interlopers were not the only British vessels plying contraband goods throughout Spanish America. The British Royal Navy entered into the illicit trade throughout the early decades of the eighteenth century, thereby actively pushing for the free-trade, blue-water empire that their Whig party backers in London so desperately wanted. 73 The image of seventy-and eighty-gun navy vessels approaching Spanish American port cities to force trade complicates the usual narrative of easy trans-imperial economic relations on the periphery of empire. 74 The threatening presence of the British Royal Navy in the waters around Cartagena gave heightened importance to the guarda costas as maritime defenders of Spanish American port cities.
Considering the threat of war and of the loss of the asiento contract, the participation of the British Royal Navy in illicit trade must be understood within Britain's larger political economy, stretching back to Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell's Western Design in the seventeenth century. Cromwell's plan to violently displace the Spanish from the West Indies ended in failure, but British planners still sought access to Spanish America's valuable resources. For that reason, the eighteenth century became the era of contraband trade in the Americas as British merchants endeavored to break through Spain's trade monopoly more completely. Yet British politicians were divided over how best to tap into Spanish American trade wealth, a division that crossed the Atlantic and complicated relations between Britain and Spain over issues of trade. On the one hand, Tory planners developed the South Sea Company as the trading entity responsible for carrying out Britain's asiento contract with Spanish America, thereby seeking access to trade through monopolizing the treaty concessions that Britain obtained through the War of the Spanish Succession. 75 On the other hand, Whigs sought to ''pry open Spanish American markets for British manufactures. '' 76 Jamaican interlopers carried out free trade with Spanish America with the tacit approval of the Whigs, while agents for the South Sea Company railed against the competition with the company's monopoly privileges. Additionally, the British Royal Navy, largely supported in Parliament by Whigs, aggressively defended Britain's trade with Spanish America-both licit and illicit. 77 The issue of armed British vessels weighing anchor at Spanish American ports brought to the fore questions of imperial dominance and the very security of Spain's American possessions in ways that Jamaican interlopers never had. Though the 1729 Treaty of Seville proved a diplomatic success for Patiño in gaining British support for the seizures of Tuscany and Parma, part of the treaty betrayed the heart of Spanish fears regarding armed British navy ships engaging in trade in the Americas. According to the treaty, Britain agreed to ''prohibit and effectively bar under any pretext ships of war of his British Majesty from sheltering, escorting, or protecting the embarkations that commit illicit commerce on the coasts of the dominions of his Catholic Majesty.'' 78 Yet, just as Patiño used the threat of guarda costa violence for diplomatic gain despite promises made in the Treaty of Seville, the participation of the British Royal Navy in contraband trade supported the political will of the Whigs in Parliament despite their own promises to terminate the trade. For the Spanish, the British policy of forcing open trade in Spanish America with ships of the line as a wedge struck a deeper chord than the arrival of illicit bolts of Brittany linen or barrels of North American flour. For Patiño and Spanish American officials such as Mendinueta, the British Royal Navy turned the tables in the proxy war waging in the Caribbean.
The Royal Navy's primary responsibility in American waters was to restore Britain's maritime prestige, which had suffered by the seizures of British vessels by the guarda costas. For an empire that prided itself on the extent of its trade and naval power, Patiño's policy hurt the British where it counted the most by curtailing Britons' freedom of navigation. According to an editorial in the London Magazine, reprinted throughout North America, ''it is impossible that the British Commerce can be safe in any Part of the World where it can be interrupted by a Spanish Cruiser, or Guarda Costa,'' because, as the commentator noted, the Spanish ''seize every English Ship they can make themselves Masters of.'' 79 The danger of guarda costa attack, moreover, extended beyond the British Empire's merchant vessels. In one case off the coast of Cuba, the sloop Hannah and Lydia, captained by Edward Sunderland, was seized by a Puerto Rican guarda costa vessel. In addition to the taking of the vessel and its valuables, the passengers aboard the sloop were reportedly beaten and abused at the hands of their Spanish captors. 80 British subjects expressed their outrage at their curtailed liberties as some members of Parliament agitated for war.
Before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear, however, both the Whigs and the British navy faced constraints on how far they could push back on the Spanish Empire. 81 The diplomatic maneuvers that allowed Patiño to promise to rein in the guarda costas while simultaneously encouraging their actions paralleled the efforts of the British to maintain peace at the very edge of war. Though the South Sea Company still held the asiento contract, and the British public remained heavily invested in the company's stock, outright war proved impracticable. Within such limitations, however, the British Royal Navy carved a niche in the smuggling trade to Spanish America by using force or the threat thereof for economic gain. For British imperial planners, the role of the navy supported their commercial interests in the Americas. For Jamaican officials, however, the navy's extracurricular Perhaps just as prejudicial to Jamaica, however, was the competition offered by the Royal Navy to the island's lucrative interloping trade. According to Governor Archibald Hamilton, Jamaican merchants as early as 1712 ''Complain of the discouragement of their trade, particularly of the most considerable and advantageous branch of it, that to the Spanish coast, through Commanders of H.M. ships of war having in great measure engrost it and carrying it on with the Queen's ships.'' Rather than argue that the Royal Navy's extralegal trade interfered with its ability to protect the island, Hamilton went on to argue that the ships of the Royal Navy engaged in commerce with Spanish America ''to the discouragement of that of the merchants'' of Jamaica. 82 Hamilton's later successor, Governor Lawes, made a similar complaint about the navy's trading activities, along with protests about the state of the island's security. According to Lawes, the Royal Navy carried merchandise to Spanish America, ''which otherwise would be done by vessells belonging to the Island, and consequently be a livelihood to numbers of seafaring men, who now have not bread for want of employment, which is the chief occasion of so many of them going a pyrating. '' 83 In Lawes's calculations, not only did the Royal Navy neglect its duty to protect Jamaican shipping but, by cutting into the interloping trade, the navy further harmed the island by forcing its unemployed seamen into piracy. Caught in the crosshairs of these competing commercial interests were the port cities of Spain's American empire.
Like Patiño's manipulation of the contraband trade for the good of Spanish imperial policy, the Royal Navy's engagement in illicit trade served as a tool of empire that benefited Kingston as much as London, despite complaints from Jamaican officials. Smuggling by the Royal Navy reflected a wider British political philosophy regarding free trade and open navigation of the world's oceans, a philosophy that Jamaican interlopers themselves embraced. The point was an old one, argued effectively by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, that the Atlantic was a mare liberum despite Spain's claims to dominion. According to Grotius, non-Iberian powers had no duty to respect Spain's claim to a mare clausem Atlantic, by which trade and possession remained in the hands of the ''discoverers'' in perpetuity. Taking Grotius's seventeenth-century argument further, the British Empire of the eighteenth century wanted much more than just the ability to navigate the 82. CSP, 1712-14, 123; emphasis in original. 83. CSP, no. 272, 1717-18, 271. Atlantic; they wanted the right to ply their manufactured goods at any port in that mare liberum. 84 The British Royal Navy brought the benefit of superior arms to force such trade on Spanish America, benefiting all British subjects with an interest in transimperial trade.
The South Sea Company engaged in the asiento contract in the hope of amassing wealth through access to Spanish American ports, but such desires were largely unattainable. The monopoly privileges of the company also meant that company traders ostensibly operated within the confines of the law, unable to engage in the more profitable free trade of Jamaican interlopers. 85 In response to these confines, British negotiators sought and received permission for a licensed vessel of first five hundred and later one thousand tons to trade to Spanish America in sync with the annual Spanish trade fairs. 86 In the long run, however, the Kingston interlopers would far eclipse the South Sea Company in supplying the Spanish Main with much-needed trade goods. 87 This decline in the profitability of the asiento contract for the South Sea Company, in the years before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins' Ear, coincided with a Whig-dominated political desire for free trade in the Americas. Violence perpetrated against British mariners further added to the calls for war against Spain, the loss of the unprofitable asiento contract then being seen as worth the risk.
The goal of attaining free trade in the Americas at the expense of the Spanish monopoly was embraced by the Royal Navy's leading commander in the Caribbean during the War of Jenkins' Ear. Following his successful attack on Porto Bello in November 1739, Vernon wrote to Sir Charles Wager to extoll his accomplishment-the opening of a Spanish American port to British trade. According to Vernon, Porto Bello served as one of ''the principal mart[s] for our merchants,'' who exchanged manufactured goods for bullion in the years ''before the establishing a South Sea Company interrupted the private trade.'' 88 A devotee of the notion of free trade, Vernon appeared little concerned with the damage that interloping caused the South Sea Company, despite the British company's monopoly on trade with Spanish America. Vernon considered that his principal task in Porto Bello was to ''lay a solid foundation of intercourse between our merchants and them, to recover so beneficial a trade to the nation.'' 89 Smuggling, rather than trading companies, embodied the Whig ideal upheld by men like Vernon. In such a philosophy, the nation grew strong through the trade of manufactured goods, which were shipped by British vessels, thereby strengthening the navy, and bought with foreign bullion, thereby accruing wealth while weakening the enemy. The South Sea Company, however, interrupted a prosperous trade in Porto Bello, which, Vernon recalled, ''flourish[ed] here above thirty years ago,'' and which he restarted by forcefully opening the port to interlopers.
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The popular celebrations following Vernon's success at Porto Bello epitomized the wider British sense of entitlement to free trade in the Americas. Though imperial planners in Britain recognized the truth in Lord Haversham's argument that trade and naval strength ''both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of Britain,'' the early decades of the eighteenth century witnessed a popular enthusiasm for maritime dominance. Much of this attention stemmed from the vociferous outcry of merchants and their supporters in the press regarding guarda costa attacks. According to the historian Kathleen Wilson, daily conversations in Britain revolved around trade and the guarda costas as the people and Parliament agitated for revenge on the Spanish Empire. 91 The lines ''Tame proud Iberia, shake ye Gallick throne, Give freedom to the World, and keep her own,'' from A Skit on Britain, reflect such popular sentiment. For Londoners, the British press, and the navy, free trade in the Americas became an issue far more important than sheer economics. 92 Rather, mare liberum in terms of navigation and trade came to symbolize the very freedom and survival of the British Empire. In this sense, Vernon fought for more than just new markets for British manufactures during the War of Jenkins' Ear.
Despite the pomp and rhetoric about the importance of his majesty's navy and its very real role in defending British merchants from guarda costa harassment, men like Edward Vernon found themselves undersupplied for 89 Carrying extralegal goods defied the wishes of the Admiralty Board and opened British American ports up to foreign aggression, but the trade was essential for the maintenance of his majesty's ships in American waters. For Vernon, as for Mendinueta, one of the primary concerns was receiving enough food to keep his men at sea. The main ordnance store for the British navy in the Caribbean was on the tropical island of Jamaica, which meant that the majority of the foodstuffs needed by the navy arrived through North American trade channels. Yet, as Vernon complained to the Victualling Board, ''I am greatly apprehensive if they depend on [North American trade], his Majesty's Forces will run the hazard of starving here.'' For, despite the bellicose language of British North American merchants who complained of guarda costa attacks, Vernon stated that those same merchants preferred to trade with possessions of the Spanish and French crowns because the merchants received ''their payments from them either in money, or commodities [and] they can get at lower prices.'' 94 Some of the most basic needs of the British Royal Navy-food and clothing-were met by the contraband trade, despite clear regulations from the Admiralty Board prohibiting naval ships from carrying on such commerce.
For both Mendinueta and Vernon, providing adequately for their crews proved even more important considering the competition prevalent in the eighteenth-century Caribbean for competent seamen. Not only did men of the sea have their choice among interlopers, privateers, and merchantmen of their own empire, but the maritime world proved highly permeable between empires. As we can see in the famous case of Edward Coxere, who served on Spanish, Dutch, British, and Turkish ships before being taken prisoner by the Spanish, imperial subjecthood mattered little in the open blue waters of the world's oceans. 95 Even Vernon complained of the ''shock . . . to think there can be wretches as abandon'd as even to desert the service of God, as well as the Crown and their country, by going over to the enemies of our holy religion'' during the early stages of the War of Jenkins' Ear. For Vernon, these seamen's ''ingratitude is the more shameless, as a principal view of this war, has been to secure our seamen from being prey to Spanish Guarda Costas. ' ' And yet, instead of the prescribed capital punishment for such desertion, Vernon granted the recalcitrant seamen a general pardon if they returned to their British vessels. 96 By granting deserting sailors a pardon, Vernon was displaying not uncharacteristic leniency but, rather, a pragmatic outlook in response to the constant competition and wide market available to seamen.
Though impressments filled the British navy's rosters, it remained up to individual commanders to keep those men when the ships weighed anchor at various ports. Perhaps for this reason Captain Christopher O'Brien argued, ''It is [the captain's] indispensible duty to see that the poor seamen be not wronged of his due, nor the service carried on by noise, stripes or blows,'' and ''not the ship made the prison of, but where the service requires immediate and constant attendance.'' 97 For men like Vernon, ''immediate and constant attendance'' was mandatory to retain enough men to put ships out each season. Despite the technical illegality of British navy ships carrying contraband trade, the minor transgression meant that Vernon supplied his men and kept navy operations in the Caribbean running smoothly. While Vernon was a professed advocate of free trade, what the Spanish deemed contraband trade, he was also as dependent on that trade as his Spanish counterpart at Cartagena. Both Vernon and Mendinueta competed for available seamen, thereby increasing their dependence on contraband trade in order to provide their maritime crews with supplies.
With the participation of the British Royal Navy in the contraband trade to Spanish America, violence in the years leading up to the War of Jenkins' Ear escalated out of control. Though the guarda costa fleets sailed with instructions to disrupt British American shipping, they encountered more than just unarmed merchantmen. Nor were Spanish American settlements free from harassment by their British counterparts. In 1715 the governor of Cuba complained to Governor Hamilton of Jamaica that several vessels had been fitted out from that island and that ''some of them had landed near Havana and committed hostilities on the ships and dominions of the King of Spain.'' 98 Even Rear Admiral Charles Stewart admitted that many of the British seamen who complained about the depredations of the guarda costas were themselves guilty of illicit trade and barbarity in Spain's American possessions. 99 Perhaps the greatest danger for Spanish seamen seeking out British prizes came when they encountered not prizes but vessels of the Royal Navy. Such was the case when Captain William Laws sailed the Drake through the Windward Passage on a voyage to London. En route, the vessel was ''attack'd by a Spanish Privateer, who took her for a Merchantman.'' The mistake proved costly to the unfortunate guarda costa seamen when the Drake returned fire and sank the other ship, killing all those on board.
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Though British crews faced abuse, torture, and even death at the hands of guarda costas, some Spanish American seamen risked a fate worse than any of those. Many of the eighteenth century's seamen were mixed-race, but men of African descent on board guarda costa vessels faced enslavement at the hands of their British captors. After a Spanish American seaman by the name of Juan Casado Valdés reported being imprisoned by a Jamaican privateer who attempted to sell him into slavery, the governor of Cuba, Alonso de Arcos Moreno, wrote to the Council of the Indies. According to Moreno, the widespread British practice of enslaving mixed-race Spanish American seamen ''will be the cause of the end of [Spanish] privateering on these coasts, with the fear which has gripped the free blacks and mulattos of falling into slavery.'' 101 For those free seamen of mixed ancestry, encounters with British American mariners became struggles to maintain their freedom and avoid enslavement on British soil. As a way station for the trans-Atlantic slave trade, moreover, Jamaican markets sat poised to absorb men like Valdés. Such fears comingled with the general British hysteria over the barbarity of the guarda costas, which sparked vicious battles when ships of the two empires encountered one another on the high seas. either side of the Caribbean increased pressure on already strained sources of supply for both Vernon and Spanish Naval Admiral Blas de Lezo. In a letter from Lezo, intercepted by Vernon, the Spanish commander demanded ''a speedy supply of above three hundred thousand quintals of beef, pork and dry provisions, and seventeen hundred barrels of flour'' from the French governor of Léogane, L'Arnage. The order indicated to Vernon that ''it is plain [Lezo] is greatly distressed for provisions. '' 102 Yet the free trade that Vernon and his supporters encouraged in the Caribbean before the outbreak of the war proved detrimental when the conflict got under way. For, even as Vernon celebrated Lezo's lack of supplies, he published orders in North American newspapers commanding the cessation of the provisions trade to Spanish America. The New-York Weekly Journal, among others, approved of the measure and stated, ''The Prohibition for Exporting of Provisions, to any foreign Parts is well received among the People here, it being Judg'd a most effectual way of distressing our Enemies who are in great Want thereof, and without which their Fleets will be unable to put to Sea. '' 103 Despite the seemingly unanimous agreement with Vernon's order, however, Cartagena stocked its garrisons in anticipation of the siege with provisions from British American interlopers.
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In hindsight, the siege of Cartagena appears an odd choice for a major British navy operation. Within the larger political economy of the Spanish Empire, the port city of Cartagena proved important because it possessed a very secure harbor for anchoring the treasure fleets. British imperial planners were familiar with the formidable geography and architecture of Cartagena both because of previous naval operations and because of the fact that Cartagena served as a base for the South Sea Company. The success of Cartagena's guarda costas pointed to a more vigorous imperial presence in the region and should have given Vernon and his superiors second thoughts about their proposed invasion. Yet, just as eighteenth-century observers lamented the supposed venality of Spanish American contraband trade, many saw only decay when they looked at Cartagena. Assumptions of corruption, vice, and disloyalty among Spanish American officials ''portend[ed] a fatal revolution'' in the years leading up to Vernon's amphibious assault, leading British troops to rush headlong into a foolhardy mission on the Spanish Main. Despite Vernon's numerical superiority and Cartagena's supposed weakness, the invasion proved to be an unmitigated failure for the British. The troops and fleet arranged to rendezvous on the island of Jamaica before proceeding on to the assault of Cartagena. For many of the troops, however, their hiatus in Jamaica proved disastrous, and many succumbed to fever or sickened themselves on the island's plentiful supply of rum. 106 The disease environment of tropical Cartagena was no improvement over that of Jamaica and was compounded by the mismanagement of such a large force on the part of Vernon and Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth. Perhaps more damaging to Vernon's assault, however, was the robust and brilliant defense put up by the city's soldiers and inhabitants. Focusing their forces on the defense of Fort St. Lazar, the Spanish defenders of Cartagena sank their own ships in the harbor to keep Vernon from positioning his ships close enough to provide cover for British ground forces. The British were further lulled into complacency regarding the invasion when they handily took Boca Chica Castle and St. Joseph's Fort, finding ''only three drunken Spaniards'' at the latter. 107 The same would not be true of Fort St. Lazar. There, rather than fleeing to the British banner, Cartagena's defenders fought their last stand to repulse the invaders. Too late to save the lives of hundreds of invaders, Vernon would come to understand where the residents of Cartagena's loyalties lay.
Violent encounters between guarda costas and British American seamen in the circum-Caribbean illuminate the ways in which contraband trade served as a tool of Britain's and Spain's transimperial political economies. The smuggling activities of Mendinueta and Vernon, rather than portraying illicit trade between subjects of disparate empires as a clandestine but unavoidable evil, point to the ways in which illegal inter-imperial trade could serve the purposes of metropolitan planners. Mendinueta supplied the guarda costas with illicit wheat in order to defend the strategically important port of Cartagena. Furthermore, Mendinueta's guarda costas accomplished the broader task of harassing British shipping, which allowed Patiño to successfully push his patron's Italian designs at the negotiating table. The British Royal Navy entered the Atlantic in part as a response to guarda costa harassment of British shipping. Yet naval commanders like Vernon remained too undersupplied to maintain well-fed and, even more important, well-paid crews in the competitive eighteenth-century maritime world. 
